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China’s Integrationinto the ReglOnaland International  





the yuanis animportant object ofinterestinthe management ofthe reglOnaland  
internationalexchangeratereglme．  
This paper examines the process of China’sintegrationinto theinternational  
且nancialsystem．Indoingso，itseekstoprovideaplatformforassesslngthefutureof  
China’sroleintheregionalandinternational丘nancialsystem．  
The丘rstpartofthe paper reviews the recentrise ofChina’simportance ofthe  
globaleconomyanditsimplicationsfor丘nancialmarketinteractions．Thepaperthen  
PrOCeeds to review the e鮎ct of China’s commitments under the protocoIs ofits  
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TheriseofChinaintheglobaleconomy   
China，simportancein the globaleconomy has been growing rapidly sinceit  















Source：CEICdatabase，HongKong．   
In2002，EastAsianeconomies’exportsgrewbyamodest5．3percent．EastAsian  
exportstotheUSwerevirtuallystagnant，grOWingbyonlyl．3％，andexportstoJapan  
shrankby－4．8％．Yet，eXPOrtS tO China（including re－eXPOrtS throughHongKong）  
JumPedby32．7％．WithoutthehelpoftheChinesemarkets，EastAsia’sexportswould  
haveexperiencednogrowthin2002．  
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TablelSharesofChina，JapanandUSAinEastAsia，sTotalExports（％）  









































China’sstatusaSatOP destinationfordirectinvestmentisunlikelytochangeinthe  
foreseeablefuture．The Chinese governmentrecentlyprojectedthatFDIinnowswill  
growtoUS＄100billioneachyearbetween2006and2010．  
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trend，however，isincreasinginvestmentinthe electronic and higher－teChnology  
SeCtOrS，Particularly aroundthe Shanghaiarea．Part ofgrowth ofdirectinvestment  
intothesesectorsinChinainvoIvesrelocationofproductionfacilitiesfromotherEast  
Asianeconomies．Thishasledtopessimism，ParticularlyinSoutheastAsiabutright  
around the reglOn，abouttheimpact ofChina’sJOlningthe WTO ofthe rest ofthe  
reg10naleconomy．  
This pessimism bears closer examination．Figurelshows that China not only  
COmPeteS Withits EastAsian neighbours but also，and moreimportantly，is now a  
major marketforthem．In2002，China’s totalexports roseby22percentbuttotal  
importsalsoJumPed，by21percent．OneofthehctorsdrivingChina’sunusualtrade  
expansionis the shifting tech supply chain．With the continuing relocation of  
PrOductionhcilities，Chinahasemergedasamajorexporterofelectronicandhigher－  
technology products at thelabour－intensive end ofthe spectrum．At the same time  
China stillneeds toimport more sophisticatedintermediate goods and components  
from other East Asian economies，ParticularlyJapan，Korea，Taiwan，Malaysla，  
PhilipplneSandSingapore．  
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China’sgrowingcurrentaccountandcapitalaccountsurpluseshavecontributedto  






Figure3 Foreign Exchange Reservesin SelectedAsian Economies，2001and2002  
（US＄billion）  
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Note：CN：China；HK：HongKong；ID：Indonesia；IN：India；JP：Japan；MY：Malaysia；PH：  
PhilipplneS；SG：Singapore；TW：Taiwan；TH：Thailand．  
Source：CEICDatabase，HongKong．   
While China’s ascendancyin theinternationaleconomy may be overstated  
SOmeWhatinthecontextofthepresentsluggishexternalenvironment，thelong－term  
trendseemslikelytocontinue．In2002，China’s GDPamountedtoUS＄1，273billion，  
aboutaquarterofthatofJapan’sGDPorone－tenthofthatoftheUnitedStates．Ifthe  
Chineseeconomycanmaintainaveragegrowthof7－8percentperannumoverthenext  
two or three decades，it willovertake theJapanese economyin20－30years even  
assumlngthatJapancansuccessfu11yreturntoa2－3percentgrowthpathquicklyin  
thecomlngyearS．  
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the domestic丘nancialsystem．Many Chinese economists and policy－makers were  
sympathetictotheviewthat，underthesecircumstances，CaPitalaccountliberalisation  
would be unwise and the plan toliberalisethe capitalaccount was postponed  
inde且nitely．   
The pace of丘nancialintegration has，despite the brake on capitalaccount  
liberalisation，Pickedupinrecenttimes．Inthe agreements onWTO accession，the  
Chinesegovernmentmadeslgnificantcommitmentstoopenupthedomestic丘nancial  
markets（see Table2）．In the banking sector，forinstance，foreign banks were  
permittedtoengageinforeigncurrencybusinessimmediatelyaftertheWTOaccession・  




the routine granting of bankinglicences，there willbe no more restrictions on  
geographic or business scope offoreign banks’operations．In May2002，Citibank  
became the nrstforeign banklicensed to receiveforeign currency depositsfrom  







Per Cent after two years．Initially only Shanghaiand Guangzhou wi11be open to  
insurancejointventures．BeijingandanotherninemaJOrCitieswillbeopenaftertwo  
years，andthegeographicalrestrictionswillbeeliminatedafterthreeyears．  






beyondthecommitmentsmadeintheWTOagreements．   
First，forelgninvestors are now allowedto buyinto more domestic companies，  
including the state orlegalperson shares oflisted companies・Manyforelgn  







foreigninstitutionalinvestors（QFII）system．It allowsforeign banks，insurance  
COmPanies orfund management firms，With more than US＄10billion assets under  
management，tOinvestinbondsorstockslistedinthedomesticmarkets（seeTable3）．  





the Chinesedepositoryreceipts（CDR）system（forHongKong－1istedH－Sharestobe  
tradedindomesticmarkets）．  
69   
Table2 China，s WTO Commitments on FinancialMarket Liberalizationin the First  
FiveYears  
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Forelgn CurrenCy Additiona1 4 Local  Additional Additional No  Corporate  
Ba工血ing  CurrenCy  4 cities：4 cities：restriction  
business  Zhuhai，  Ningbo，   S  
With  all Beijing，  Shenyang，  
COmPanies Xiamen， Shantou，  





business with all cities：  
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Auto  loans  
without market  
accesslimitations  
100％  Eliminatio Fullrange Fullrange  
OWnerShip n of all of non－1ife of group，  
Permissible geographi services pension  
for allnon－ C  Permitted and  
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Access to S  of health PrOducts  
Be再ing and  lnSuranCe  
lO maJOr  Permitted  
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Non－1i鮎 51％ or  
branch，1ife 50％；  
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to  forelgn  
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PrOducts available  
to local and  
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Table3TheNewQuali負edInstitutionalInvestors（QFII）policyFrame  






Afterthelock－inperiod，less than20％each time withinterval  
morethan3months，COnditionalonapprovalbytheauthorities  
Individualinvestors could hold no more thanlO％ofindividual  
StOCks；foreigninvestorscollectivecouldholdnomorethan30％  
ofindividualstocks  
Publishing＆distribution；telecominfrastructure；power grid  
COnStruCtion＆management；securities companies；program  
PrOductionforTV＆丘1m，andcableTV；andChinesemedicine  
Toquali付   
Fund sizes 










in Shanghai，ZhQjiangand Guangdongwantingtoinvestoverseas nolongerneedto  
Seekapprovalfromthecentralauthoritiessolongastheaggregatesizeofinvestment  
does not exceed US＄200millionin each province or municipality．The government  
PlanstoextendthisexperimenttoFujian，JiangsuandShandongin2003．   
ThecapitalmarketinChinaisincreaslnglyopen，markedinmanyareasbythelax  




Chinese stocks and bondsininternationalcapitalmarkets．H－Shares（Chinese  
companieslistedin HongKong stock market），forinstance，are nOW animportant  
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Figure4SharesListedinHongKong（HShares）：NumberofSharesandNewCapital  
Raised  
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mustbetocompletethereformofdomesticnnancialsystems．   




Industrialand CommercialBankofChina（ICBC），the Construction BankofChina  
（CBC）andtheAgriculturalBankofChina仏BC）comprisethisgroup．TheNPLratio  
forthesebankswas muchhigherthanthe sameratioinpre－CrisisThailand，South  
Korea，IndonesiaandMalaysla．  
China’s entryintothe WTO，and theincreased openness to competition from  
forelgn且nancialinstitutionsandamongdomesticbanksthatitforeshadowed，reVived  
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anxieties about the sustainability of the Chinese banking system．Foreign bank  
COmPetitionislikelytobelimitedtothecoastalarea，atleastinitially，butitisalso  
trueisthattheSOCBsgenerate95percentoftheirpro丘tsfromabouthalfdozenof  
the coastalcities，including Shenzhen，Guangzhou，Ⅹiamen，Shanghai，Tianjin and  
Beijing．  
The Chinese banking systemis already quite diversified，including the policy  
banks，theSOCBs，the smallcommercialbanks，ruralandurbancreditcooperatives  
andforeignbanks，havingdevelopedfromastate－dominatedmono－banksysteminthe  
pre－reformperiod（seeTable4）．ThebigfourSOCBsstilldominatebothintermsof  






that actualNPLratios are probably stillsomewhathigherthanreported，aVeraging  




Shareintotalloans  Shareintotaldeposits  
（％）  （％）  Typesofbanks  
Policybanks（3）  12．2  
State－OWnedcommercialbanks（4） 66．5  
Smallcommercialbanks（100）  5．9  
Urbancreditcooperatives（836）   4．3  






0．5  Foreignbanks（65）  1．8  
Note：The data arefor end－2001．The numbersin parenthesesin the丘rst column are  
numbers ofbanks orcooperativesinthe category．The threepolicybanksinclude  
China Development Bank（CDB），China Export andImport Bank（EXIM）and  
AgriculturalDevelopmentBankofChina仏DBC）．ThefourlargeSOCBsincludethe  
IndustryandCommerceBankofChina（ICBC），theBankofChina（BOC），theChina  
Construction Bank（CCB）and theAgriculturalBank ofChina（ABC）．The small  
commercialbanksincludelOjoint－StOCkbanksand90citybanks．  
Source：CompiledbytheauthorsfromdatapublishedbythePeople’sBankofChina・  
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Table5 HealthoftheChineseBanks  
1996  1998  2000  
Non－performingloanratio（％）   
Thestate－OWnedcommercialbanks（4）  35．0  40．0  25．O   
Thejoint－StOCkbanks（10）  13．5  14．O  
Capitaladequacyratio（％）   






NPL ratios of around20－25per cent，Stillexcludethel．4tri11ion yuan already  
transferredto thefourAssetManagement Companies（AMCs）affi1iatedtothefour  




The authorities nowhave a three－SteP reform programinplaceforthebanking  
sector（seeTable6）．The丘rststepinvoIvescontinuationofthereformoftheinternal  
management systems ofthe banks，includinglmPlementation of theinternational  
Standard丘ve－CategOryloanclassincationsystemandimprovementofthecreditculture．  
Inthe second step，thefour SOCBs willbe transformedinto share－holding entities，  
POSSiblyintroducingstrategicdomesticandforelgninvestors．And，allofthebanksare  
toaimatpubliclisting，domesticoroverseas，aSthelaststepintheprocessofreform．  
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Table6TheCurrentReformProgramfortheBankingSector  
Areas  KeyMeasures  
Resolving NPLs AMCs continue to deal with Rmbl．4trn of NPLs  
SOCBsarerequiredtolowertheirNPLratiosby2－3pptseach  
yearinthenext5years   
Relatively independent bank supervision departments are 
establishedwithinthePBOC   
Step l：Reforms to internal management system  
Step 2：Implementation of the share・holding system and  





The PBOC actua11y requires thefour banks tolower their NPL ratios by2－3  
PerCentagePOintseveryyearinordertoreducetheaverageNPLratiotobelow15per  
Centby2005．Manyo］阻cialsappeartobecon丘dentthatthistargetisachievable．First，  
Withthe new standardloanclassi丘cation systeminplace，banks andregulators are  
abletobettermonitorandcontroIcreditrisks．Second，thePBOChasalreadyputin  
Placearrangementsforloanprovisioning－2percentforspecialmention，25percent  
forsub－Standard，50percentfordoubtfu1andlOOpercentforloss－and demanded  
that allbanks to achieve these requlrementSin3・5years．Third，the PBOC has  
grantedautonomytothecommercialbanksinidentifyingandwritingoffNPLs．And，  
且nally，tOimprovethebanks’丘nancialpositionandfacilitatetheworkoutoftheNPLs，  




Problemsinthree areas，ifnot resoIved quickly，Wi11be a dragonthe banking  
reformprocess．The丘rstproblemrelatesto stateenterprisereform．AlthoughChina  
hasalreadyengagedinmassiveprivati＄ationofthestatesectoroverthepast丘veyears，  




theirfunds to purchase governmentbonds withless than a3per cent yield．More  
importantly，abouthalfofnewloansoverthelast丘veyearswereextendedtostate・  
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SPOnSOred projects．These strategies are obviously not sustainable．And the third  
PrOblemisrelatedtothecorporategovernanceandriskmanagement．Whilebanksare  





l，100companieslisted ondomestic stockmarkets，mOrethan95percent are state－  
OWnedenterprises．Tomakeitworse，thecompanieswerepickedbylocalgovernment  
basedonaregionalquota system．Inotherwords，theywere oftenselectedfortheir  
importancetothelocalgovernmentnotbecauseoftheirefficiencyorpotential．Because  
China maintains a closed capitalmarket，StOCk market prices were pushed up  





in terms ofcompany structure，COrPOrate gOVernanCe and prlCeS．Butin China as  
anywhereelseintheworld，adjustmentinstockpricescanbepoliticallysensitiveand  
risky．From2001，the CSRC attemptedtoraise somerevenuesfortheunder－funded  
SocialSecurity Fundthroughsales of state－Sharesin the domestic stock market．  




towards capitalaccountliberalisation are thus conditionalon completion of the  
COnSOlidationofdomesticstockmarkets．  
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Figure5ShanghaiA－ShareMarket：PriceIndexandPrice／EarningRatio  
Jan－92Jan－93Jan－94Jan－95Jan－96Jan－97Jan－98Jan－99Jan－00Jan－01Jan－02  
博一lndex（LHS）－P／E ratio（RHS）   
Source：CEICdatabase，HongKong  
Futureevolutionoftheexchangeratepolicy  
During the earlier period ofeconomic reform，China had a dualexchange rate  
system，Withanofficialrateandasecondarymarketrate．FromApril1994，thetwo  
rateswereuni且edintoonerate，Whichwassetat8．7totheUSdollar．Thisrequireda  
substantialdepreciationofthe ofncialexchange rate（ofaround50percent）but a  
relatively modest（8per cent）e鮎ctive depreciation ofthe currencybecause a very  
largeproportionofforeignexchangetransactionswasalreadybeingconductedthrough  
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Apr－94Jan－950ct－95JuL－96Apr－97Jan－980ct－98Juト99Apr－00Jan－010ct－01Juト02  
－CNY／USD ♯CNY／100JPY   
Source：CEICDatabase，HongKong．  
Circumstances changed dramaticallyin2002as Chinese exports expanded，the  
current account position continued to strengthen and foreign exchange reserves 
mounted．Thetalkoutside Chinaturnedtotheneedfor，andthepossibilityoちyuan  
revaluation．Theissueofyuanrevaluationisnowalsobeingdebatedamongeconomists  
andpolicymakersinChina．  
Supporters ofa丘Ⅹed exchange rate policy regime are mainly concerned about  
impactofanyexchangeratechangeoncurrentmomentumoftheeconomy（seeTable7）．  
Itis argued thatthe current且Ⅹed exchange rate policy helps maintain stable  
expectations amonglnVeStOrS．Achange may afEbct FDIflows．Trade officials worry  
thatrevaluationofyuancouldhurtexports，Whichareanimportantdriverofgrowth．  
A stronger currency couldfurther depress domestic prices，Particularly wages，and  
thereby exacerbate the problem of deflation．And thereis also concern about the  
distributione鮎ctsofrevaluationasastrongeryuanmightaggravatetheinequality  
PrOblem as richimport－COnSumerS eI再oyedlower prices while bread－Winnersin the  
exportsectorreceivedless．  
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Table7TheCaseforandagainstCNYRevaluation  
For revalwation Against revaluation 
Rapidlyimprovingexternalaccounts   
Needformacropolicynexibility   
Properpricingofforeigncapitalandrisks   
International politics and policy  
considerations  
Stable investor expectation 
Exacerbationofwageandpricedenation   
Fearforexportslowdown   
Concerns over deteriorating incorne 
distribution  
Source：Compiledbytheauthors．  
The caseforintroducing moreflexibility to China’s exchange rate policy has  
recently been gathering strength．Rapidlyimproving externalaccounts callfor a  
StrOngeryuan．In2002，thetradesurplusroseby27．7percenttoUS＄29．5bnandthe  
CurrentaCCOuntSurPlusstoodataroundl．8percentofGDP．Thebalanceofpayments  
POSition alsoimproved steadily．Part oftheimprovement has been due to China’s  




alsohelpbetterpriceforeigncapitalandrisks．While a且Ⅹedexchange rate maybe  
helpfu1inunderplnnlngStableexpectationsuptoapoint，underthisreglme，investors  
maybeseducedintounder－eStimatingrisks．Moreimportantly，aSalargeanddynamic  
economy，China needs macroeconomic policyflexibility to accommodate changesin  
domestic markets．Although，Chinais not Hong Kong，the 且Ⅹed exchange rate  
COnStrains flexibilityin monetary policy andlimits the government’s ability to  
accommodate changesin domestic and externaleconomic environment．There are  
increasingly strong demandsfrominternationalcommunity，Particularlyfrom the  
UnitedStates，JapanandotherEastAsiannations，forChinatorevalueitscurrency．  
Allthese nations areimportant Chinese economic partners，andinterdependence  
between China andthese economiesis expectedto risefurtherinthe comingyears．  




The recentweakeningofthe US dollar adds to the casefor a new approachto  
exchange rate policy．Itis probable that the Chinese government might re－think  
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exchangeratepolicyinthecomingmonths，althoughtheexacttimlngOfpolicychange  
is difnculttopredictasthe governmentisinthethroesofagenerationalchangein  
POlicyleadership．Butevenifthe governmentadjusts exchange ratepolicystrategy，  
thereis unlikelytobe anydrasticchangeinthevalue oftheyuan．The mostlikely  
Changewouldbeawideningofthebandforexchangeratemovementsto＋／－3percent  
initially，equlValenttoa3percentappreciationinthenrstinstance．  





The change has a direct negativeimpact on macroeconomicindicators．A3％  
revaluationofthecurrencycouldcutO．360fapercentagepointoffChina’sGDPgrowth  
（seeTable8）．Thisis arelativelylarge e鮎ctfora3per centrevaluation andthe  
StruCtureOfthemodelusedheremaywellexaggerateitsmagnitude，ifnotitsdirection．  
The growth of totalconsumption，tOtalfixed assetinvestment andindustrial  




Citigroup  Scenario  Di鮎rence  
base・CaSe  aSSuming 3％  
scenarlO  Yuan  
appreciation  
GDPGrowth（％yoy）  7．60  7．24  
TotalConsumption（％yoy）  8．30  8．26  
FixedCapitalInvestment（％yoy）   8．30  8．06
Exports（％yoy）  12．80  12．16  





TradeBalance（US＄bn）  34．O  
CurrntAccountBalance（％GDP）1・80  
ForelgnExchangeReserves（US＄bn）330．O  
FiscalBalance（％GDP）  －2．80  
IndustrialProduction（％yoy）  11．60  
CPI（％yoy）  0．50  
Source：CitigroupestimationapplyingtheOEFmodel．  






Figure7Impactof3％YuanRevaluationonGDPGrowthofOtherEconomies   
Thailand   
Singapore  




Hong Kong  
Korea  
・Taiwan   
Euro area   
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US  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Basis points  
Source：SimulationresultsuslngtheOEFmodel．  






international丘nancialmarketsis domestic丘nancialand enterprlSe reform．Interest  
rateliberalisationisanessentialpartoftheprocessof凸nancialsystemreformandthe  
integrationofthe domestic andinternationalcapitalmarkets．Financialmarketand  
enterprise reformis an urgent and necessary taskin preparationfor opening the  
CaPitalaccount．Itis also aconsiderabletask．Stepstowardscapitalmarketopenlng  
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Ought notbe heldoveruntildomestic financialmarket reformis complete．The two  
PrOCeSSeS CannOt eaSilybe sequenced discretely．The powerfu11y attractiveidea that  















OPPOrtunitiesforforelgnParticipationinthe capitalmarket arelikelyto strengthen  
market practices and efBciencies．The Chinese authorities have been remarkably  
forward．lookinglnaCknowledgingandacceptingtheroleofforelgnParticipantsinthe  




now committed to a similarlybig roleforforelgn Playersin the且nancialcorporate  
SeCtOr．Thiswillnotonlyassistinthestrengthenofdomesticmarketsandinstitutions  
but，it should be understood，force the pace ofinternational丘nancialmarket  
integration，multiplying the channels andlinks via which theinternationalmarket  
interactswiththedomesticmarket．  
A policy choice thatisfundamentalto successin managing deeper nnancial  
marketintegrationis the choice about change to the exchange rate reglme．Almost  
always the strategicinitiativein exchange rate reglme Change has been missed  
managingeconomicand丘nancialtransformationinEastAsia．Thiswasmostnotably  
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SOinthelead・uptOthe EastAsian丘nancialcrisisinthelate1990s．But，eVenmOre  
importantly，JapanandKoreahistoricallywere reluctantto changethe approachto  
exchangeratemanagementwhentheiroldrigidexchangerateregimeshadlongsince  
used their used－by dates．Itis possible to explain this reluctancein each country’s  
Circumstance atthetime．Butthegenericproblemisclearenough．Arigidexchange  
rateregimeandinflexibleexchangeratepolicyisinvariablythelinchpinofthewhole  
POlicy frameworkin a pre・reform controlled economy and pulling the plug on the  





The stronger and more supportive theinternationalframework within which  
Chinese policymakers can interact with policymakers and policy professionals 
elsewherethemorelikelyitisthatpolicyjudgmentandchoicewillbewellinformed  
and strategica11y directed．Failureto takeinto accountthefeedbackeffbctsofpolicy  
actionandlackoftheirawarenessbecomesanincreasinglyimportantpolicyfrailtyas  
the scale andimportance of an economy grows．Thisfrailtyis not only plays out  
throughpolicy circles andininternationalpolicy commentary，butit also plays out  
directly throughthe market．Enhanced policy transparency throughappropriately  




the Manila Framework Group and the ASEAN＋3dialogues，alongside the global  
鋭nancialcooperation arrangementsthroughtheIMF，markthebeginnings ofa new  
regional丘nancialarchitectureinwhichChinamustplayamoreandmoreactiverole．   
Chinaalreadyaccountsfor5．6percentofworldtrade，ifHongKongtrade（netof  
intra－HongKong－Chinatrade）is addedtothat ofthe mainland．The prqjections of  
trade and economic growth mentioned above willsee China overtakeJapan asthe  
reglOn’slargesteconomyandtheworld’sthirdlargesteconomyaftertheUnitedStates  
andEurope．   
With successfulimplementation ofthe且nancialand economic reforms to which  
Slgni且cant commitment has already been made，China appears bound to become a  
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Slgnincant且nancialplayerininternationalnnancialmarkets overthe next two to  
threedecades．ThereiseverylikelihoodthatintheprocessShanghai，forexample，Will  
emergetoovertakeHongKong，Singapore，andevenTokyo，aSthemaJOr丘nancialhub  
inEastAsia．   
AtthesametimeChinawillsteadilyassumealargerandmoreimportantrolein  
theinternationalandregional丘nancialsystemanditsmanagement．  
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